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QUALITY STABILIZATION AND THE CRISIS 
IN FAIR TRADE 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER* 
Historically examining Fair Trade laws and their treatment by the state 
and federal courts, the author notes that Fair Trade has fallen into increasing 
constitutional disfavor. Professor Alexander then examines in detail one of 
the several quality stabilization bills wlzich have been introduced for con� 
gressional consideration. Noting that in part quality stabilization with its 
provisions for price�fixing parallels Fair Trade, he points out that significant 
differences exist betweel& the two concepts, botl& in purpose and effect. He 
concludes that, if adopted, quality stabilizatiol&, with its pervasive price protec� 
#01&, will impose eVel& greater restrictions 01t competition at the retail distribu� 
tive level than those imposed by state Fair Trade laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rejected, abandoned, and wounded, Fair Trade is but a pitiful skele­
ton. Clearly incapable of rejuvenation sufficient to bring it to its youthful 
vigor of the "thirties," its prognosis is grim indeed. Spirit gone, it will 
likely be left to die. A successor has already been conceived. Quality 
stabilization is heralded as the new medium of legalized resale price 
maintenance. 
' 
The economic demerits and merits of Fair Trade have been fully and 
often heatedly discussed in the past.1 Little mention of them wil be 
made 1i�rein. Instead, this article will concern itself with a postmortem 
examination of Fair Trade and the extent of congenital effect to be 
expected by quality stabilization. 
REJECTED 
At the time of this writing, the highest courts of twenty-three states 
have, in one manner or another, declared their own nonsigner Fair Trade 
provisions unconstitutionaI.2 One territory (Puerto Rico) in which Fair 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; A.B., LL.B., University 
of Pennsylvania; Member of the Bars of Ilinois and New York. 
1 See, e.g., Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 Yale L.J. 967 (1955); 
Adams, Fair Trade and the Art of Prestidigitation, 65 Yale L.J. 196 (1955); Herman, A 
Note on Fair Trade, 65 Yale L.J. 23 (1955). 
2 Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 147 So. 2d 797 (Ala. 1962); Union Carbide & 
Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); Olin 
Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956); Miles Labs., Inc. 
v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954); Cox v. General Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 
(1955); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Sbane Co., 237 Ind. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957); 
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Trade was constitutional, repealed its Fair Trade law.3 For proponents 
of Fair Trade, even this rather depressing statistic is an understatement 
of the degree to which Fair Trade is currently rejected.4 
It is, for example, significant that the states which have declared Fair 
Trade unconstitutional have based their decisions primarily on bedrock 
constitutional principles, a factor which makes it unlikely that minor 
rewording would suffice to placate the courts. Indeed, in three instances, 
the courts have vitiated a Fair Trade bill which was passed after an 
initial bil was declared unconstitutiona1.5 A number of states have 
denied the right of the legislature to legislate in the area of general 
pricing either because of specific constitutional provisions relating to 
economic policy, for example, a provision preventing monopoly or com­
binations in restraint of trade,6 or because, more generally, pricing of 
consumer goods is held not to be within the affected-with-a-public-interest 
concept.7 Moreover, Fair Trade has been found to be outside the usual 
Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N.W.2d 365 (1961) i 
Quality Oil Co. v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958) i 
General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958) i Dr. G. H. 
Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 
(1956) i Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 
N.W.2d 268 (1952) i Remington Arms Co. v. G.EM. Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102 N.E.2d 528 
(1952); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 359 P.2d 644 (Mont. 
1961) ; McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955) i 
Skaggs Drug Center, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 63 NM. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957) i Union 
Carbide & Carbon CorP. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958) i The 
verdict on the latest Ohio act is not yet in. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Columbus Vitamin & 
Cosmetic Distribs., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) If 70360 (Ohio App. June 19, 
1962) (unconstitutional); Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 176 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio App. 
1960) (constitutional); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Benny Homsey & Associates, 361 
P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961); General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956) i 
Rogers-Kent, Inc., v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957); General Elcc. 
Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956) i Remington Arms Co. v. 
Skaggs, 55 Wash. 2d 1,345 P.2d 1085 (1959); General Elec. Co. v. A Dandy Appliance Co., 
143 W.Va. 491, 103 S.E.2d 310 (1958); Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 
409 (Wyo. 1962) .. ' 
3 Laws of P.R., Act No. 3 of July 29, 1958, 2d Spec. Sess. 
4 For one thing, only decisions of the highest courts of the states have been considered. 
A lower court in at least one state (Idaho) has also declared its state act unconstitutional. 
I) Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954); Cox v. General Elec. Co., 211 
Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955) ; Union Carbide & Carbon CorP. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio 
St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958). 
6 General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956) i Union 
Carbide & Carbon CorP. v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 359 P.2d 644 (Mont. 1961). 
't Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N. 
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police power concepts of health, morals, and general  welfare.s Con­
sequently, in many states this was sufficient to place it without the legis­
lature's prerogative. Still other courts found that Fair Trade was unlaw­
ful as a delegation of legislative power in allowing price fixing by private 
individuals for partisan interests.9 One court which might have allowed 
legislation in this area and perhaps even the delegation of authority to 
fix prices to persons outside the legislature, has condemned fair trading 
for failure to provide a standard governing the price to be set, thereby 
allowing the price to be set "arbitrarily.mo Still other courts have 
thrown out state Fair Trade on the ground that it violates due process 
in depriving the holder of the trade-marked article of a property right by 
fixing his prices.u Indeed, a few courts have gone so far as to suggest 
that, despite the apparent constitutionality of the McGuire Act,12 state 
Fair Trade violates federal constitutional guarantees against deprivation 
of property rights without due process.13 
A regrettable feature of these rejections, from the standpoint of an 
advocate of Fair Trade, is not only the already disheartening majority 
declaration of unconstitutionality but its influence in the remaining 
states. .It would indeed be an extreme overstatement to say that the 
eighteen states14 in which Fair Trade has some constitutional sanction 
are bastions of Fair Trade. In the first place, the recentness of the 
number of decisions declaring Fair Trade unconstitutional15 gives some 
measure of support to the suggestion that a "trend" is forming toward a 
W.2d 268 (1952); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 
558,275 S.W.2d 455 (1955). 
S Ibid. 
9 Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N.W.2d 365 (1961); 
Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 231 La. 51, 
90 So. 2d 343 (1956). 
10 Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954). 
11 E.g., General Elec. Co. v. American Buyer Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958);  
Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957). 
12 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958) which survived {:onstitutional attack in� 
Sunbeam Corp. v. Richardson, 243 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1957); Giant Super Mkts. v. Ell 
Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953). 
13 E.g., Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilg Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949); 
General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956). 
14 In addition to the twenty-three states which have invalidated fair trade.in decisions by 
the highest court, supra note 2, one state has challenged fair trade in a lower court decision, 
supra note 3. Alaska, Missouri, Texas and Vermont have no fair trade acts and fair trade has 
not faced a court test in Maine, Nevada or North Dakota, judging from the reported cases. 
15 See note 2, supra. 
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declaration of unconstitutionality.16 Secondly, Fair Trade has always de­
pended significantly on the universality of its support. Consequently, 
each state which rejects Fair Trade, even if it does not thereby persuade 
other states to take similar action, makes it just that much more ex­
pensive and difficult to maintain Fair Trade in the remaining states. 
The number, twenty-three, in any event, is a very misleading number. 
In a number of states that have considered the question recently, the 
courts have, despite earlier decisions upholding Fair Trade, issued what 
appear to be judicial warnings that the end of the constitutional road 
may soon be reached. A case in point is Glaser Bros. v. Twenty-Fifth 
Sales CO.17 In that case, a superior court in California found that the 
nonsigner principle was inapplicable to purchasers who were not in a 
chain of title of, or in some kind of privity with the price-setter. To rule 
otherwise, said the court, might raise substantial constitutional and 
other problems. In the face of the transparent fact that nonsigner pro­
visions were designed to affect people who are not in privity of contract 
and who have in no way shared in the distributive chain which was con­
tractually bound, such a ruling could mean that nonsigner Fair Trade is 
in trouble in its originating state.18 In North Carolina, despite a 1939 
decision which held nonsigner Fair Trade constitutional, l° a lower court 
in a recent case dissolved a restraining order issued under the state Fair 
Trade law on the ground that the law was unconstitutional. When the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, they surprisingly found no 
occasion to chide that court for its failure to heed precedent. Instead, 
the lower court decision was reversed solely on the ground that the con­
stitutional question had been prematurely reached in violation of the 
concept of judicial' abstention. 2o The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
which only last year upheld Fair Trade, 21 found itself hinting this year 
that the constitutionality of the depression-originated legislation may no 
longer survive a test.22 
16 The existence of a trend was suggested in Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 
147 So. 2d 797 (Ala. 1962). 
17 Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) II 70565 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 1962). 
18 California adopted nonsigner fair trade in 1933. It was the first state to do so and be­
came the model for later acts. The act in its present form may be found in Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 16900-05. 
19 Eli Lily & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163,4 S.E.2d 792 (1960). 
20 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Davis, 253 N.C. 324, 116 S.E.2d 792 (1960). 
21 Mead Johnson & Co. v. Martin Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 408 Pa. 12, 182 A.2d 741 
(1962). 
22 In accordance with the familiar principle that a court wiII not decide a constitutionnl 
question unless it is absolutely required to do so, we refrain from considering the prob-
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Decisions in other cases in which Fair Trade has been upheld demon­
strate a palpable amount of disaffection for the concept. In upholding 
the non signer clause, the Delaware Supreme Court in General Elec. Co. v. 
Klein23 sustained the. act, primarily on the ground that the. underlying 
economics were fairly debatable and thatT within the field of debatable 
economics, legislative action was not challengeable. In upholding the 
federal constitutionality of the state's Fair Trade law, a district court 
in Maryland, 24 although it felt itself bound by precedent, indicated itS' 
strong disfavor with the law and offered what appears to be considerable 
encouragement to an appeal and its own reversa1. 25 
ABANDONED 
Aside from the outright rejections and hints of rejection mentioned 
above, Fair Trade has lost substantial support. To some extent, as pre­
viously mentioned, this loss of support can be traced to the rejection 
elsewhere. Not all of the abandonment has a foundation in legal rejec­
tion, however. A number of companies have apparently abandoned fair 
trading because the requirement that a uniform price be maintained has 
cut sales to high-volume discount houses. Still others have abandoned 
Fair Trade, finding the enforcement program too difficult or too ineffec­
tive. Many more have abandoned Fair Trade for reasons that are un­
known. 26 The legislature of Puerto Rico has, despite a judicial holding 
of constitutionality, 2'1 legislatively abandoned Fair Trade. 28 Among 
lem at this time . • • •  However, we cannot fail to observe increasing objections to the 
legality of nonsigner provisions in particular and to the economic soundness of fair 
trade bills in general. • • • Changing patterns of merchandising and distribution re­
quire a reappraisal of the underlying premises of fair trade legislation. 
Shuman v. Bernie's Drug Concessions, Inc., 187 A.2d 660, 664 (Pa. 1963). 
23 34 Del. Ch. 491, 106 A.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
24 Parke, Davis & Co. v. G.E.M., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 207 (D. Md. 1962). ' 
25 In view of the decisions • • . this court, while completely unpersuaded, does not 
feel that it, as a trial court, should set itself up as above its numerous superiors and 
equals in authority • . • .  As, however, the point has not been decided by the Fourth 
Circuit, and this court feels so strongly upon it, the court . • . if requested . • • and 
if an application for appeal be made • • . wil stay proceedings in this court. 
Id. at 213. 
26 Some of the difficulties of enforcement of a fair trade program a):'e chronicled in 
Brecher, Buying at Discount, 14 Consumers Union Reports 420 (1949). 
2'1 Esterbrook Pen Co. v. San Juan F. Vilarino 5 y 10, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 
1956). , 
28 Laws of P.R. Act No.3 of July 29, 1958, 2d Spec. Sess. The preamble to the repealing 
law states: "It was in the decade beginning in 1930 that the type of legislation known as 
'fair trade laws' came into being . • . .  The present price situation calls for a public policy of 
low prices in order to combat the threat of inflation that would reduce the purchasing power 
of money." 
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manufacturers who favor Fair Trade, whether they have maintained a 
program of fair trading or not, there appears to be despondency at the 
current course. Certainly the representative proponents of retail price 
maintenance claimed, in the hearing on a bill which would strengthen 
Fair Trade, that the present program had been substantially undermined.20 
WOUNDED 
Perhaps more significant than either the outright rejection or the 
abandonment of Fair Trade, are a number of decisions which seemed, 
nominally at least, to have favored Fair Trade, but which have resulted 
in fashioning or re-emphasizing substantial impediments to its effective 
enforcement. It is well accepted, for example, that in order to maintain 
a Fair Trade price in a state, it is necessary that the fair trader enforce 
his price maintenance against al retailers and that failure to do so 
affords an adequate defense to a violating retailer. The enforcement of 
this duty has led a number of courts in Fair Trade states to interdict fair 
trading because the manufacturer was unable to plug all the leaks in the 
dike at the same time. 30 In this vein, a New York court, while granting a 
preliminary injunction against Fair Trade violations after initially refus­
ing to do so, pointed out that the plaintiff in such a case has the burden 
of showing that "it is presently vigorously and without discrimination 
enforcing its fair trade rights."31 
In another case, a New Jersey court invoked a common provision in 
corporate statutes, namely, that a corporation may not bring suit in the 
state unless licensed to do business in it, in order to bar a Fair Trade suit 
by a manufacturer without such license. 32 On the one hand, such a 
manufacturer, if he is truly not doing business in the state is faced with 
the onerous burden of obtaining a license which in turn may subject him 
29 Take for example this colorful passage: "The afflictions of Job and agonies of Samson 
were as nothing compared to the travails of this trade [the appliance-radio-TV trade] over 
the past decade. One of the more lamentable aspects of this saga of sorrows has been n very 
considerable problem relating to the maintenance of product quality standards in the face of 
general price demoralization. A degeneration of the marketing atmosphere into something 
like a state of anarchy has been the inevitable result." Statement by Richard E. Snyder, Con­
sulting Economist. Hearings on S.J. Res. 159 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com­
-mittee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1962) . 
30 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1955 
Trade Cas.) IT 68098 (D. Wis. July 20, 1955) . 
31 Parke, Davis & Co. v. Jarvis Drug Co., 208 F. Supp. 350, 353 (S.D.N.Y.1962 ) .  
32 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs, Inc., 5 7  N.J. Super. 291, 154 A.2d 650 (Ch. Div. 
1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 591, 158 A.2d 528 (1960), aff'd, 366 U.S. 276 (1961) . 
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to the personal jurisdiction of the local courts and may bring about tax 
consequences not to mention the annoyance of certification itself.33 On 
the other hand, if he chooses not to maintain suits in the state by reason 
of the aforementioned rule, he may be effectively prevented from main­
taining his state Fair Trade price by being unable to enforce it. At the 
time of this writing, however, no other state appears to require this 
choice on the part of a would-be fair trader. 
In part, of course, this problem is a function of the person entitled to 
bring suit. Some states have allowed persons lower in the distributive 
chain than the manufacturer to be plaintiffs in Fair Trade actions. The 
lower one may go in this chain without removing himself from the class 
of permissible plaintiffs, the less onerous the burden of the certificate. 
In both New Jersey34 and California35 there is precedent allowing a 
wholesaler or other temporary owner of the goods to set the resale price 
although the California holding would seem questionable in light of a 
recent California case.36 Furthermore, at least in New Jersey, even a 
retailer may enforce a resale price once it has been set.3'1 
A further source of difficulty for the fair trader has been the pro­
vision in the McGuire Ac�8 which specifically excludes horizontal price 
fixing from the act's protection.39 Under this provision it has been held 
that a vertically integrated producer may not set the price of a seller 
with which it competes for sales;4 0  a similar result has followed where 
there have been isolated retail sales by a manufacturer without integra­
tion.4 1  The same provision bears the responsibility for a recent case 
decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.4 2 In that case, despite 
33 See Henn, Corporations § 101 (1961) . 
34 Schenley Prods. Co. v. Franklin Stores Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 100, 199 Atl. 402 (Ct. Err. 
& App. 1938) . 
35 Parrott & Co. v. Somerset House, Inc., digested in 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) 
II 3170.05 (Cal. Super. 1937) (unreported). 
36 Glaser Bros. v. Twenty-Fifth Sales Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) II 70565 
(Cal. Super. Nov. 20, 1962). 
3'1 Schenley Prods. Co. v. Franklin Stores Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 100, 199 At!. 402 (Ct. Err. & 
App. 1938) . 
38 66 Stat. 631 (1952) , 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1958) . 
39 "Nothing [herein] . .  ; shall make lawful contracts or agreements . • .  between pro­
ducers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, 
or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other." 66 Stat. 632, 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (5) (1958). 
4 0  United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) . 
4 1  Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc., 246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.1957). 
4 2  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays, 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960). 
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a statutory provision which appears to validate retailer enforcement of 
Fair Trade, retailers were denied a remedy on the ground that their 
combination for purposes of enforcing Fair Trade was found to be in 
violation of the federal antitrust laws. So holding, the court avoided a 
question of interpretation of the Pennsylvania act as to a retailer's ini­
tiation rights and also bypassed the question of the act's constitutionality. 
In a similar situation, the United States recently filed a complaint charg­
ing violations of sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act against retail 
druggists who had been engaged in establishing a Fair Trade system for 
products which they sold.4 3 
There have been other comparatively minor annoyances to fair traders. 
One court reasoning from the sometimes requirement that the price-fixer 
uniformly fix his retail price44 held that a price cut in a single area of 
the state vitiated the Fair Trade agreement; this was true, despite the 
fact that the price cut was a means of conducting a market test on the 
acceptability of the product at a lower price.45 Another court held that 
a refusal to deal with a retailer who was a price cutter justified the re­
tailer's sale of goods below the Fair Trade price.46 The latter court found 
an inequity in requiring price maintenance when the retailer could not 
obtain renewal of the goods he was selling.47 Finally, courts have refused 
to enjoin retailers from distributing the now ubiquitous trading stamps 
with the sale of fair traded goods, despite the fact that the courts recog­
nize that the practice in question would have the indirect effect of lower­
ing prices below the established leveI.48 
Among the major blows to Fair Trade, one of the most significant was 
the determination that sales could be made from a non-Fair Trade state 
to consumers in a Fair Trade state without adherence to the Fair Trade 
4 3  Complaint in United States v. Hawaiian Druggist Ass'n filed in the District Court of 
Hawaii, June 29, 1962, reported in 52 A.T.R.R. A-7 (July 7, 1962).  
44 See Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 2 N.Y.S.2d 
320 (Sup. Ct. 1938) . 
45 Gillette Co. v. White Cross Discount Center, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cns.) 
IT 70481 (Pa. C.P. Sept. 19, 1962) . 
46 Lentheric, Inc. v. Weissbard, 122 N.J. Eq. 573, 195 Atl. 818 (Ch. 1937). 
47 Id. at 575, 195 Atl. at 819. Contra, Parker Pen Co. v. Charles Appliances, Inc., 153 F. 
Supp. 69 (S.DN.Y. 1957); Dorothy Gray, Ltd. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 45 F. 
Supp. 744 (D. Conn. 1941). 
48 Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939) . Contrn, Colgatc­
Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co., 337 Mass. 221, 148 N.E.2d 861 (1958) (trading 
stamps); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950) (redeemable cnsh 
register receipts) . 
1963] QUALITY STABILIZATION 791 
prices.40 This decision increased in importance as a greater number of 
states dropped Fair Trade. While its import is not necessarily uniform 
on the fair trading of all products, there are a substantial number of 
products brought under new competitive pressure because of the fact 
that "they may be secured within a Fair Trade state at discount prices 
by the mere expedient of locating a mail order house in a; non-Fair Trade 
state. Of course, even without the decision, the existence of the product 
at non-Fair Trade prices conceivably puts some competitive pressure on 
the stores near the boundaries of the state, irrespective of the legality of 
shipment into the state. 
Another blow was dealt to Fair Trade by a California court. In 
Glaser Bros. v. Twenty-Fifth Sales Co./o the Superior Court for Alameda 
County refused to allow a wholesaler to enforce Fair Trade prices on  
cigars against a California retailer who had purchased the cigars from an 
out-of-state wholesaler. The court felt that substantial problems would 
be raised by allowing someone other than the manufacturer to set Fair 
Trade prices for all retailers within the state in that this could lead to the 
establishment of two different prices where there are more than one 
wholesaler of the product in the state. The court also found constitu­
tional difculty with a Fair Trade concept not requiring a privity of con­
tract or, at least, a chain of title between the person being asked to 
maintain the resale price and a signator to a retail price maintenance 
contract. 
This decision is interesting from a number of standpoints. In the first 
place, the problem of allowing someone other than the manufacturer to 
maintain the Fair Trade program has been raised in other states, and the 
decisions have, in some cases, demonstrated little difficulty in allowing a 
wholesaler, and sometimes other persons, to establish a program.51 One 
of the courts which had previously been faced with the problem was the 
Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, which in 1937 
in the case of Parrott & Co. v. Somerset House, Inc.,5 2 had reached an 
opposite conclusion. The Parrott court had been faced not only with the 
problem of the authority of persons other than the manufacturer to set 
49 General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 824 (1957) . 
liD Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) II 70565 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 1962) .  
51 Norman M .  Morris Corp. v. Hess Bros., 243 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Schenley Prods. 
Co. v. Franklin Stores Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 100, 199 AU. 402 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938); Old Fort 
Dearborn Wine & Liquor Co. v. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co., 287 lli. App. 187 (1936) . 
5 2 Digested in 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) II 3170.05 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1937) (unreported) . 
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the price, but had even grappled with the problem of the possibility of 
mUltiple pricings, finding such pricing unlikely in light of the original 
owner's right to exercise his initiative in insuring that a single price be 
maintained in the state. There is, of course, something to be said for the 
proposition that if the owner of the trademark is not himself involved in 
Fair Trade pricing, his apathy at what is designed to be the protection 
of his trademark might lead courts to conclude that it was not a mark 
which needed the protection of Fair Trade pricing. It is also a seemingly 
legitimate assumption that the farther down the distributor's chain that 
resale price maintenance is actually accomplished, the greater the likeli­
hood that fair trading will be used to effect interests of retailers or 
wholesalers who are, at least in theory, not the intended beneficiaries of 
Fair Trade pricing. Nevertheless, the fact remains that by deciding as 
it did, the Glaser Bros. court has lessened the effectiveness of Fair Trade 
in California. 
The suggestion that a type of chain of title or privity of contract be 
required in fair trading is again an interesting assertion for a court in 
California since the California nonsigner provision, G3 which introduced 
the concept of binding dealers who had not contractually bound them­
selves was the national model for such legislation. It is also interesting 
to note that the case was decided in the same month that another court 
on the other coast of the country was holding the contract in Fair Trade 
pricing to be largely an irrelevancy.54 While it is by no means clear 
whether the Glaser Bros. decision will remain the law in California and 
even less clear whether it will have any effect in the other Fair Trade 
states, its wide adoption might again hasten the already precipitous 
course of Fair Trade. 
Finally, the Pennsylvania courts have, of late, found new significance 
in the McGuire Act requirement that goods to be fair traded must be 
in "free and open competition with similar goods, 1l55 and by enforcing 
this provision have contributed another substantial cloud to the future of 
Fair Trade as presently constituted.56 Indeed, at this point, it does not 
53 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code � 16904. 
54 In Mead Johnson & Co. v. Westchester Discount, Health & Vitamin Center, Inc., 212 F. 
Supp. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962),  the court held that the fact that there may be contractual defi­
ciencies in the underlying contract on which the fair trade law is based is not determinative of 
the validity of the price set in it since it serves a purely documentary function in the program. 
55 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays, 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960). 
56 It is surprising that despite the existence of the free and open competition provision in 
the McGuire Act, little serious effort had been made at its enforcement prior to the recent 
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seem unlikely that if Fair Trade succumbs completely, the courts of 
Pennsylvania will have been largely responsible for bringing about its 
fate. It is hard to imagine that any of the states which have declared 
Fair Trade unconstitutional, even those which have invoked the most 
evil-sounding constitutional rationales, will have made the impression of 
the Pennsylvania courts on the ultimate outcome of Fair Trade. Not 
even the suggestion of the Supreme Court of Alabama that a "trend " had 
been established against the constitutionality of Fair Trade57 seems likely 
to match the impression made by a comparatively short series of cases 
in the state of Pennsylvania. 
Pennsylvania has what, by national standards, is a comparatively 
rigorous Fair Trade law.58 It provides expressly for enforcement of a 
Fair Trade program by retailers as well as persons higher in the chain of 
distribution.59 The act had the affirmative sanction of the highest court 
of the state.GO For these reasons, little concern was probably felt by Fair 
Trade advocates with respect to the continued effectiveness of the state· 
program. Quite unexpectedly, it would appear, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania decided, on its own motion, that it ought to consider Fair 
Trade in a broader context. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays,61 the court, 
despite the fact that no issue as to free and open competition remained 
after the pleadings, raised the question whether gasoline could be fair 
traded in the state because of the apparent lack of competition between 
the major oil companies. Holding that a plaintiff desiring to enforce 
Fair Trade had the burden of establishing that his product was in free 
and open competition, the court reversed the finding that would have 
allowed the oil company an injunction against a price-cutter. 
Pennsylvania action. Its major prior application was a holding that color film, at that time 
exclusively sold by the fair trading seller, was not in free and open competition with black 
and white film which the other sellers retailed. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d 
Cir. 1946) , cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947). This lack of vigorous enforcement is especially 
puzzling in light of the fact that this provision was perhaps the only provision in the act de­
signed to insure that some economic pressure be brought to bear in setting the price of 
Fair Trade goods. In fact, one scholar in this field has gone so far as to suggest that with 
proper enforcement of this provision the Fair Trade concept might be shorn of many of the 
objections which others have levied against it. See Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact 
and Fancy, 64 Yale L.J. 967 (1954) . 
57 Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 147 So. 2d 797 (Ala. 1962) .  
58 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit .  73, §§ 7-11. (1960). 
59 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 7. (1960) . 
60 Burche Co. v. General Elec. Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955) . 
61 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960) . 
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As startling as the Gulf Oil decision may have been, it was possible 
after the decision of this case to ascribe it to the peculiarities of the 
oil industry. The Gulf Oil court emphasized that the major oil companies 
in many instances sold: each other's gas as well as charged identical 
prices. The former argument, while not addressed precisely to the free 
and open competition concept, was thought relevant since trademark 
protection could hardly be accomplished in the context of selling 
another's product. The latter had a direct relevancy to the openness of 
competition. Perhaps, one could speculate, fair trading was not possible 
for oil, but as to other products remained unchallenged. Admittedly, a 
common pleas court in Philadelphia,B2 shortly after the Gulf Oil case, did 
rule that retailers, despite their apparent statutory favor, could not 
enforce Fair Trade; but with the exception of these two blows, Fair 
Trade seemed for the time immune from further attack. As late as the 
middle of last year, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was expressly 
upholding the constitutionality of the state Fair Trade program.03 In 
September of 1962, however, a common pleas court in Pittsburgh,04 read 
the Gulf Oil decision as a directive to examine the freeness and openness 
of competition and, finding that Gillette razor blades were subject to 
comparatively little competition from other blades, refused an injunction 
against a price-cutter of that product. For good measure, it also ruled 
that a Fair Trade program could not be maintained when complying re­
tailers were allowed to give bonus stamps which could amount to as much 
as thirteen per cent rebate on sales of fair-traded items; this was true 
. despite the fact that the court followed an older Pennsylvania rUlingOG 
which held it consistent with a Fair Trade program to give trading stamps 
(these amounting to less than a two per cent rebate). It further ruled 
that Fair Trade was, of necessity, based on state-wide pricing and that 
aD. area price cut, even one designed as a market test for the lower price, 
vitiated enforcement of Fair Trade pricing. 
Those seeking solace were unlikely to find it in the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania which only three months later decided the appeal of 
Shuman v. Bernie's Drug Concessions, Inc.oo In that decision, the court 
62 Shuman v. Bernie's Drug Concessions, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) U 70270 
(Pa. C.P. Feb. 19, 1962) . 
63 Mead Johnson & Co. v. Martin Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 408 Pa. 12, 182 A.2d 741 
(1962) . 
64 Gillette Co. v. White Cross Discount Center, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cns.) 
U 70481 (Pa. C.P. Sept. 19, 1962) . 
65 Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939). 
66 187 A.2d 660 (Pa. 1963).  
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ruled that retailers which had been instrumental in forcing Fair Trade on 
their suppliers were improper parties to enforce compliance. The court 
did not go further and rule on either the question of interpretation of 
the Pennsylvania act, which would appear on its face to provide the 
right denied in this case, or on the constitutionality of the act. In the 
latter context, however, the court spoke in menacing terms.67 It may 
well be that the trend suggested by Alabama may yet find another convert 
in Pennsylvania. Should that happen, Pennsylvania will not only have 
added to the already staggering list68 but also will have contributed 
gnawing problems for those who remain in the other camp. 
Most significant among the problems that have been raised in Pennsyl­
vania, of course, is the problem of free and open competition. So far, its 
ambit has reached only two classes of goods. In both cases the court 
seemed convinced that there, was little substantial competition. One is 
left with the question, especialy if the original suggestion of the court 
be taken at face value and each plaintiff be put to the burden of proving 
that his product is in free and open competition, whether that doctrine 
will strike down goods sold in markets where there is neither the extreme 
concentration of the razor blade industry or the suspected cooperation 
of the oil industry. If free and open competition means, in addition, that 
the fair traded product must be brought under price competition by 
another product, one wonders how many items could ultimately remain 
in the Fair Trade category. It would seem that a manufacturer, forced to 
maintain uniform prices on his product among all retailers in the face of 
what could be sporadic price cuts in the "competing" product, would be 
hard put indeed, if the products were truly interchangeable, to continue 
his program without some loss. Where such active competition did not 
result, might not the absence of this conduct itself be persuasive of the 
fair trader's failure to establish free and open competition? 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT FAIR TRADE PROGRAM 
Two states faced with a declaration of unconstitutionality with respect 
to their previous nonsigner Fair Trade program have adopted a new 
order in resale price maintenance. Both Ohi069 and Virginia70 have at­
tempted to revamp their trade law so as to give a trademark owner a. 
continuing property right in his mark and through that right a right to 
67 See note 22 supra. 
68 See note 2 supra. 
6D Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1333.27-.34 (Page 1962) . 
7 0 Va. Code Ann. § 59-8.1-8.9 (Supp. 1962) . 
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prevent price cutting on his product, on the theory that such cuts are 
trademark defamation. However, it seems unlikely that the new statutes 
will ultimately solve any major problem under existing law. 
The major innovation introduced by the new Ohio and Virginia legis­
lation appears to be primarily a change of focus. Instead of depending 
on a contract made between the seller and a single retailer to establish 
the basic pricing structure, the new acts permit the same result to be 
accomplished either by contract or by notice. The old nonsigner is no 
longer bound by another's contract but is bound instead by notice, 
either affixed to the product or communicated to him in some other 
manner. 
In Ohio, which had declared non signer Fair Trade unconstitutional,71 
courts are split on the constitutionality of their new act.72 Virginia has 
upheld their new act,73 but it should be noted that in its approval the 
court also indicated that it would not have stricken the more normal 
nonsigner provision as unconstitutional,74 the issue never having been 
decided by that court.75 
While a number of states which have declared non signer Fair Trade 
unconstitutional have preserved resale price maintenance as between 
contracting parties,76 there seems little reason to suppose that the law of 
contract can be sufficiently rewritten to afford the broad Fair Trade 
protection found in the Ohio formulation: 
'Contract' means any agreement, written or verbal, arising from the acts of the 
parties. . . . Any distributor [whether he acquires such commodities directly 
from the proprietor or otherwise] who, with notice that the proprietor has estab-
71 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 
481 (1958) . 
72 Mead Johnson & Co. v. Columbus Vitamin & Cosmetic Distribs., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. 
(1962 Trade Cas.) n 70360 (Ohio App. June 19, 1962) (unconstitutional); Hudson Distribs./ 
Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 176 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio App. 1960) (constitutional) . 
73 Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960). 
74 The Standard Drug court rejected contentions which are usually raised with respect to 
the more usual form of fair trade, namely, that the act violated due process, was an un­
constitutional delegation to private parties of legislative power, and was a delegation of price 
:fixing authority to private parties. 
75 In Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1956), the Virginia Supreme 
Court had affirmed so much of a lower court opinion as held that the previous nonsigner 
Fair Trade provision had been repealed by a later anti-monopoly act, finding it unnecessary 
to consider the other holding below; i.e., that the nonsigner provision violated the Virginia 
Constitution. 
76 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958). 
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lished a minimum resale price for a commodity, accepts such commodity shall 
thereby have entered into an agreement with such proprietor . . . .  77 
Virginia attempts its recodification more succinctly. cc 'Contract' means 
any agreement, written or verbal, or actual notice imparted by mail or 
attached to the commodity or .containers thereof.ll7S Whatever effect this 
third-party-notice theory may have on internal law, it would seem to 
change few issues with respect to Fair Trade. If enforcing a price 
against unwilling third parties is an unconstitutional delegation of legisla­
tive power, it remains so with notice. Indeed, nonsigner provisions are 
also unenforceable absent notice.79 If a manufacturer may not dictate 
a price to non-agreeing buyers because pricing of general commodities 
is not affected with a public interest or because this is a taking of 
property without due process, there would again appear to be little reason 
for a distinction. Rather clearly, in states in which price fixing without 
a standard violates the constitution or in which anti-monopoly and 
restraint-of-trade provisions make price fixing an illegal objective, notice 
should not affect the result. If, then, notice has any effect, it may be a 
peculiarly negative one. The McGuire Act exemption, which legalizes 
Fair Trade, provides for the exemption of "contracts or agreements 
prescribing minimum or stipulated prices"so and further exempts from 
antitrust sanction the civil interdiction of price cuts below the contract 
leve1.s1 Without questioning the right of the legislatures of Ohio and 
Virginia to redefine "contract" for internal consumption, it seems ques­
tionable that the one-party-plus-notice contract is within the meaning of 
"contract" in the McGuire Act. 
77 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. -§ 1333 28 (Page 1962). 
7S Va. Code Ann. § 59-8.2 (Supp. 1962). (Emphasis Added.) 
70 The McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 631 (1952),15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958), only exempts statutes 
which, in substance, prohibit the willful and knowing cutting of price. The issue usually 
arises with respect to the duty of the nonsigner to maintain the resale price of which he did 
not have notice at the time that he purchased the goods, although later notice was given. In 
this context a number of courts have relieved the retailer of fair trading obligations. E.g., 
James Heddon's Sons v. Callender, 29 F. Supp. 579 (D. Minn. 1939); Lentheric, Inc. v. 
Weissbard Bros., 122 N.J. Eq. 573, 195 AU. 818 (Ch. 1937). Some have not. E.g., Barron 
Motor, Inc. v. May Drug Stores, Inc., 227 Iowa 1344, 291 N.W. 152 (1940). No reported 
case, however, seems to support an action against a retailer for sales made prior to his 
receiving notice of the fair trade price. 
so 66 Stat. 632 (1952),15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (2) (1958). 
8 1 66 Stat. 632 (1952),15 U.S.C. -§ 45 (a) (3) (1958). 
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THE QUALITY STABILIZATION CONCEPT 
The Quality Stabilization Bill, which as a joint resolution last year 
won the approval of the House Committee on Interstate Commerce82 
and the Senate Commerce Sub-Committee,83 contains a number of pro­
visions which are not directly related to the problem currently under 
discussion. For example, under the proposed act an owner of a brand 
name is given the right to prevent retailers, utilizing his branded goods, 
from adopting certain deceptive practices84 as well as to require their 
adherence to his resale price. It may be, as several witnesses before the 
Senate sub-committee indicated, that the provisions are designed to 
divert attention from price-fixing provisions.8G It may, on the other hand, 
be true that a reiteration of presently existing rights against retail abuse 
coupled with a provision for civil relief is thought to be a genuinely 
desirable aim of federal legislation. However that may be, Quality Sta­
bilization is significantly to be accomplished under this act by price 
stabilization. 
Procedurally, the Quality Stabilization Bill is designed to function in 
much of the manner of the Ohio and Virginia acts.80 The manufacturer 
is to provide notice of the established price87 and the retailer, whether 
dealing directly with the manufacturer or not, is to adhere to the price 
82 H.R. Rep. No. 2352, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 
83 S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print July 26, 1962). This bill was chosen 
as the focus for discussion since it was the subject of e:'Ctensive public hearings in the 87th 
Congress. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 159 Before a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Furthermore, a number of changes were made 
from the draft as originally submitted, see S,J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 21, 1962), 
indicating close study by the committee. 
84 S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., § 8(a) (b) (c) (Comm. Print 1962). 
85 "1 know that the crux and heart of this bill • • .  refers to price fixing by dealers. If you 
take that out, 1 am sure the proponents haven't the least interest in the bill." Testimony by 
Hon. Lee Loevinger, Assistant Attorney General of the United States. Hearings on S.J. 159, 
supra note 83, at 143. Congressman Emanuel Celler, after calling the bill a wolf in sheep's 
clothing continued: "It is as clear as a pikestaff that this is a resale price maintenance bill. 
There's an old Turkish adage, 'when a cat would eat her kittens she calls them mice.' Can 
this bill what you may, it is still a resale price maintenance bill." Id. at 252. 
86 See notes 69 and .70 supra, and accompanying text. 
87 A condition to the invocation of the protection of the act is that: "said goods or the 
containers thereof or the display devices to which they are attached for sale are plainly 
marked with the resale price or prices established therefor . . • .  " S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 
2d Sess. § 8. (Comm. Print 1962). In addition, a sale below the established price is only 
significant "after written notice by [the] • . •  owner of the institution of the owner's currently 
established resale price or prices, . • •  " Ibid. 
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of which he is notified.88 Failure to adhere by the retailer gives the 
manufacturer a right to revoke, apparently perpetually, the retailer's 
right to handle any of the manufacturer's trademarked products.89 The 
bil specifically conditions resale price maintenance on the existence of 
goods in "free and open competition" with goods identified by a brand 
name,90 although the originally considered draft did not include such a 
condition.91 Price maintenance is also expressly conditioned on diligent 
policing of the provisions against all retailers.92 The federal courts are 
expressly given jurisdiction to enforce the act without respect to the 
amount in controversy.93 
While omitting an express exemption for activities under the act with 
respect to the general antitrust laws,94 the bill does give a greater range 
of right to the manufacturer than was available under state fair trading. 
In the first place, he is expressly allowed to maintain a resale price 
despite the fact that he is himself competing in the resale of his product.95 
Further, he is given the astonishing right to set a series of resale prices 
which differ from each other on any basis which is not "made unlawful 
88 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 The condition contained in the original draft was: ''When goods usable for the same 
general purpose are available to the public from sources other than the owner of such 
brand, name, or trademark, . . .  " S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., § 8 (Feb. 21, 1962). 
That this less restrictive provision may still closely approximate the desires of the quality 
stabiIization advocates seems indicated by the fact that several of the quality stabilization 
acts introduced in the present Congress revert to this draft. E.g., H.R. 2564, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 8 (1963) ; H.R. 3669, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1963). 
92 S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12 (Comm. Print 1962). 
93 S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (Comm. Print 1962). 
94 The original draft provided: "No exercise of any right or remedy provided in [this 
act] • • .  shall be construed to be a violation of any of the Antitrust Acts . • • .  " S.J. Res. 
159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (Feb. 21, 1962). This provision is again being introduced in 
new bills. See, e.g., H.R. 457, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1963). In this respect it should 
be noted that the other provisions of the act may become very significant. For example, the 
right to revoke a dealer's right to handle trademarked goods because of sales below the 
established price and the right to do so for vaguely defined acts of deceptive marketing, may 
well be used by the holder of a trademark to boycott a disfavored retailer which, but for the 
act, would be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 
359 U.S. 207 (1959). The exemption provided might reverse the anti-boycott ruling. There 
are many, other activities which might be sanctioned by the broad language including some 
unforeseeable ones. 
95 S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (Comm. Print 1962). 
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by any other statute."06 The combination of these provisions leads, to 
some rather interesting possibilities should the bill become law. 
The provision which expressly gives the right to a trademark owner 
to set the resale price despite the fact that he also participates in sales 
at the same distributive level, contains the language: "Provided, That 
such owner shall sell such identified goods at any level of distribution at 
the price established for that level of distribution.1197 This is the first 
direct suggestion in the bill that the manufacturer or other owner is to 
be given the right not only to set a retail price but to set the price at 
which his trademark goods may be sold at any level of distribution. 
While it may well be necessary for a trademark owner to set his retail 
price at such a level as to allow the retailer to make a profit, there ap­
pears to be little suggestion that the power to control wholesale prices is 
similarly necessary to protect the manufacturer's product. That aside, it 
is a little difficult to discover in the purported justification of the bill a 
reason for allowing a control over distributive prices above the retail level. 
The justification for price stabilization under both Fair Trade and quality 
stabilization has been hinged to the concept that lowering the product's 
retail price results in product defamation.os However tenuous this rea­
soning, the extension of the product defamation concept above the retail 
level seems almost incredible. If a given trademark product were being 
distributed at a price which allowed merely the normal wholesaler margin 
of profit, and if the retail price were controlled, "the product would ap­
parently be moving in its manufacturer-determined price level, and con­
sequently would be undefamed. The reduction of the wholesale price, 
which would result in giving the retailer a greater profit, should hardly 
result in the retailer's rejection of the line in question. Far from being 
disparaged, such goods would seem to gain a competitive edge by the 
greater profit margin at the retail level. 
Of course, what this provision more patently does is to provide the 
manufacturer with an opportunity to stabilize a margin of profit at 
several levels of distribution and, through use of this horizontal stabiliza­
tion, to dissipate, conceivably, some price-cutting pressure which might 
06 S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (Comm. Print 1962). This provision was addcd 
by the subcommittcc; it did not appear in the original draft. 
97 S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (Comm. Print 1962). 
os This hypothesis is thc recurring theme of the testimony of proponents of quality stabil­
ization. Sec Hearings on S.J. Res. 159, supra note 83. In part, this may be c:'tplainable by 
the encouragement which the United States Supreme Court gave to tradcmark protection in 
retail sales in Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). 
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otherwise be directed against him. Such a result is not necessarily beyond 
the purpose of this act since the act seems founded inter alia on an 
economic premise that "it is recognized that unless fair competitive 
practices [resale price maintenance] can be maintained in all appro­
priate stages in the distribution of . . . identified products, the market­
ing of . . . identified products is depressed and the quality thereof 
tends to deteriorate . . . ."99 The proposition that a manufacturer must 
be guaranteed a substantial profit if he is to produce a quality good 
may seem an unusual principle in an economy that is, at least nominally, 
dedicated to a philosophy of competition-enforced quality. Granting that 
proposition, however, the aforementioned provision seems sensible 
enough. If it is designed to do anything, it is designed to make it as 
feasible as possible for the owner of a trademark to build in a profit 
margin at each level of distribution. 
The same provision has another novel application in that, by its express 
terms, the bill would allow a trademark owner to fix horizontally a 
price with sellers in competition with him, a result specifically pro­
hibited by the McGuire Act. 100 As a result of this provision, it would 
seem desirable, indeed, for any retailer who can afford to do so to inte­
grate vertically. With a measure of vertical integration and a product in­
terchangeable at the retail level with that of some of its competitors, each 
company would become entitled by reason of its ownership of a trademark 
to make a horizontal price-fixing agreement with a competitor respecting 
the sale of its product. Moreover, if retailers are judiciously chosen for 
this purpose, it may be possible to create at the retailing level, through 
contract, a measure of integration and price stability even where actual 
integration would quite likely violate either the anti-merger provisions 
or perhaps even the monopoly provisions of federal law. Of course, the 
advantages aforementioned are not necessarily limited to the retail level 
since they can be accomplished at any given level of distribution. Again, 
this result seems reasonably consistent, granting only the basic premise 
that an increase in profits is necessary to maintain the quality of goods. 
The result seems strange, however, in light of the fact that, throughout 
the hearings on quality stabilization, the Senate sub-committee expressed 
a strong desire to prevent the act from becoming a vehicle for horizontal 
price-fixing. 10 1 
Illl Preamble to the original draft. S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 21, 1962) . It 
was removed by the subcommittee, but has returned in several of this year's bills. E.g., H.R. 
2564, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) . 
100 See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
101 For example, Senator Monroney repeatedly asked for suggestions from witnesses as to 
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The power granted by this section need not be exercised in the manner 
above indicated. It can, instead, be used to determine the profit margin 
of anyone in the distributive chain. Retailers may be rewarded by re� 
quiring the wholesaler to resell at a price considerably lower than the 
required retail price ; they may be punished by greatly closing the gap. 
Similarly, distributors at each level in the chain of distribution may have 
their profits significantly determined by one who, for all intents and 
purposes, may be a stranger to them-the owner of the trademark. It is 
indeed peculiar that, on the whole, retailers and small businessmen testi� 
fred in support of this bill which would seem a more likely product of the 
larger corporations which own the majority of significant trademarks. 
One further provision should be noted in the same regard. The bill 
expressly allows the resale price to be "differentiated with reference to 
any criteria not made unlawful by any other statute.m02 In the event 
that the trademark owner does not have sufficient power under the afore� 
mentioned provisions of the proposed statute, he is hereby given this 
additional power to force compliance by distributors and retailers. The 
brand owner by use of this section, has almost perfect control over how 
his goods shall be distributed. If he wants his goods to move quickly in 
one area and slowly in another, he has but to set a different price in each. 
Coupled with the price-fixing provisions allowed among horizontal com­
petitors,103 this power can create, without more, a division of markets as 
well as a price-fixing arrangement. Two competitive distributors need 
only price-fix each other (assuming that through vertical integration they 
become sellers of goods under a trademark owned by the other) and then 
set their respective prices so as to allow one company a low resale price 
on both its own and its competitor's commodity in one section of the 
country in return for reciprocity in another. Whether such an arrange� 
ment would be "made unlawful by any other statute" merely because 
market division is a violation of the Sherman Act,l04 is unanswerable. 
Quite conceivably, since the Sherman Act only prohibits restraints of 
trade, there is no prohibition sufficiently specific to invoke the "unlaw� 
ful" clause of the Quality Stabilization Bill. 
The price-differentiation section has still other possibilities. A given 
how to "straighten out" the provisions of the first draft which would have alIowed price 
maintenance for goods without the requirement of free and open competition with similar 
goods. Hearings on S.J. Res. 159, supra note 83, at 167. 
102 S.J. Res. 159, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (Comm. Print 1962) .  
103 Note 95, supra. 
104 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) . 
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person in the chain of distribution can be rewarded or put out of business 
by adjusting his resale price. Since there is no need to make a similar 
adjustment on al resale prices, assuming that a lawful criterion can be 
created which would identify the seller in question, much the same range 
of possibilities as above suggested for classes of distributors and retailers 
can be applied to individuals. It is not quite clear how the variable price 
level provision of the bill is to be squared with the provision which re­
quires that if a manufacturer price-maintains on a level in which he sells, 
he charge the price "established for that level." In . any event, at a mini­
mum, the trademark owner, able to conduct horizontal price stabilization 
even in its uncomplicated form on the level at which he is also a seller, 
is clearly enabled to . build in a substantial profit margin for himself 
above the level that he might achieve if other purchasers of his product 
were allowed to compete with him in price for its sale; he may also trim 
the retail profit margin sufficiently to drive out competitors in any market 
he wishes to monopolize.105 
To be sure, the trademark holder would under this bill be exercising 
no greater rights than a totally integrated producer-seller would exercise 
with respect to goods which were not sold outside the seller's stores. The 
significant point is that for all intents and purposes this bill gives a per­
son, by virtue of his ownership of a trademark, practically the same 
control over the sale of his goods as he would have had had he established 
this integrated plant. This means that trademark owners so large or so 
powerful that they could not integrate without serious threat of anti­
trust sanctions may have the benefits of that integration apparently with­
out antitrust reverberations. This also means that, large or small, the 
manufacturer of goods is given enormous economic power over those 
lower in the chain. That also seems a rather interesting anomaly. 
When the proponents of the bill spoke of its need, almost all ultimately 
addressed themselves to the plight of the small businessman. lOG This bill 
105 The Aluminum Company of America used a "price squeeze" of this sort to control 
sheet aluminum production. Its effectiveness contributed to the finding of monopolization by 
the company. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) . 
106 Some, such as Mr. Richard E. Snyder, a consulting economist, took the statistical 
approaCh. His statement, replete with charts, undertook the burden of establishing the 
deplorable condition in retailing which he colorfully described. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 
159, supra note 83, at 84-106. Others, perhaps best represented by Senator Humphrey, ap­
proached the problem by extolling the virtues of the small retailer and the vices of fly-by­
nigbt discounters. After praising the former, he testified, as to the latter: "That is generally 
what a discounter does. He comes in, sets up his establisbment, contributes nothing to any­
body, including the Community Chest, the church, or the town, and even fights over his 
taxes." Id. at 120. 
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is touted as a tool to give small retailers a new competitive weapon against 
the "discount house." In terms of the provisions of the proposed act, 
however, it seems curious that small business was the intended benefici� 
ary. Vertical integration, so helpful in utilizing the provisions of this bill 
for the purpose of increasing profit, is presumably not open to most "small 
businesses." If small businesses need greater countervailing power against 
manufacturers too prone to sell to discount houses, they are hardly given 
it by a bill that makes those manufacturers virtual dictators of the re� 
tailer's profit margin. Moreover, if the bill was designed to prevent sales 
to discount houses, it  seems strange that it incorporated a provision al� 
lowing variable resale pricing. If anything, a volume criterion virtually 
suggested by the act, and rather clearly not unlawful by any antitrust 
provision, would make it possible to freeze by quality stabilization a dif� 
ference in retail price between discount houses and regular retail sales 
without depriving the manufacturer of sales to either. All that would 
be increased in such a scheme is the manufacturer's profit from both. 
Why it has been assumed by proponents of small business legislation that 
their best alternative is to give increasing power to manufacturers is not 
known. If Fair Trade has helped retailers at all, it seems in recent years 
at least to have helped primarily because retailers, who arguably are not 
entitled to do SO/07 have invoked Fair Trade provisions in self�protec� 
tion.108 They are clearly given no such right under quality stabilization. 
They, then, are to receive their benefits from manufacturers who are to 
be 'guaranteed a profit margin sufficiently large to insure that they will 
continue to make quality goods. 
To be sure, price stabilization will only result from dictated pricing 
in industries in which retailers of the same product are otherwise in a 
position not to compete with each other, or where this is true on another 
distributive level. Moreover, price setting will only be effective with 
respect to goods which are not brought under serious competitive pressure 
by competing goods. In other words, price maintenance is likely to be 
effective only where, by using Fair Trade devices, sufficient concentration 
can be achieved and sufficient competition can be prevented so that 
there results an oligopolistic situation in which price-cutting no longer 
seems advantageous. Since, however, many trademark owners in our 
107 See notes 51 and 52 supra and accompanying text. 108 The Federal Trade Commission noted in its 1945 report on resale price maintenance 
that the leadership in the movement for fair trading has shifted to organized retailers' 
groups" especially in the retail drug trade. FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance 5 
(1945) . 
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present economy seem to be among those who are already operating in 
heavily concentrated fields, the device seems to exist in a dangerous area. 
THE PROSPECTS FOR QUALITY STABILIZATION 
During the last session of Congress, bills for quality stabilization were 
extensively discussed and won a considerable amount of support.109 
Pundits suggest that it may be in an even stronger position in this ses­
sion.11Q 
Should Congress in this session pass the Quality Stabilization Bill, it 
would, of course, make a major change in the Fair Trade prognosis. To 
begin with, it would immediately impose on the twenty-four states and 
territories which have rejected Fair Trade and the four states which have 
never adopted it a comprehensive system of resale price maintenance. 
In twenty-three states it would automatically reverse a holding of uncon­
stitutionality under the state constitution. 
With respect to the holdings of several states that Fair Trade is un­
constitutional within the federal constitution, it seems unlikely that these 
decisions will prevail. To begin with, the argument, often imposed in 
state constitutionality cases, that the pricing of general goods is not a 
matter affected with a public interest, would seem in light of current fed­
eral cases to be made too late in the constitutional development of the 
law.111 The later cases appear to support the proposition that, assuming 
a lack of arbitrariness and no invidious discrimination, economic regu­
lation on any matter thought proper by the state or Congress is constitu­
tionally immune. The closely allied point that price regulation is an 
unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law would 
appear to be equally dubious, as is illustrated by many of the same 
cases.112 The only constitutional argument that appears sufficient to over­
come summary disposition is the argument that this type of law consti­
tutes a delegation of price regulation to private persons. While the dele­
gation argument has met with some success, and is advocated as an 
appropriate reason for rejecting federal Fair Trade by one commenta-
100 In the 87th Congress, quality stabilization made considerable progress in the House of 
Representatives-it was approved by the Committee on Interstate Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 
2352, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ,  and "cleared" by the Rules Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 
2520, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) . It did not get to the floor, however. 
110 See report, The 88th Congress, 80 A.T.R.R. B-3 (Jan. 22, 1963) . 
111 See Conant, Resale Price Maintenance: Constitutionality of Nonsigner Clauses, 109 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 539 (1961) . 
112 Ibid. 
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tor,113 no federal legislatiori has been invalidated on a delegation argu­
ment since the great depression. In sum, it is at this point viewed as 
unlikely that a federal court will declare quality stabilization, if passed, 
, to be an unconstitutional statute, on these most common bases for state 
invalidation. 
One other state argument appears worthy of note. A number of states 
have pointed out that fair trade delegates not only the price-fixing au­
thority, but delegates that authority without a standard on which to 
judge an appropriate price level.114 On this basis, the unconstitutional 
delegation argument has been sustained. The same argument could be 
made to support a holding of arbitrariness which might, in state courts, be 
sufficient to invalidate the legislation. Even conceding this argument, 
however, the federal courts seem unlikely to find quality stabilization 
violative of the constitution. 
One negative effect which the proposed federal legislation might con­
tribute to the enforcement of Fair Trade is a likely result of freeing fed­
eral district courts, which have in the past indicated their reluctance to 
enforce Fair Trade, from the mandate to follow state law.11ri Left to their 
own devices in interpreting quality stabilization, it may well be that terms 
such as "free and open competition" may be given the strict interpreta­
tion which the Pennsylvania courts have applied, or perhaps one even 
stricter which would require that there be active price competition be­
tween products, as for example, that all products in a given line cannot 
be fair traded at essentially identical prices. A commentator has sug­
gested that with such an interpretation of Fair Trade, its influence would 
be minimal.116 
Aside from the free and open competition requirement, an apparently 
reluctant addition to the act in the first place, the phrase "unlawful by 
any other statute," which qualifies the option of the fair trader to vary 
his prices, is another vague term which disillusioned courts might well 
construe strictly. 
More obviously, the effect of the Quality Stabilization Act would be 
to make price maintenance national in scope since there need be no inter­
state competition in the price of the product. While the manufacturer 
must, of course, still' reckon with the price of competitive goods, except 
for the influence of those goods, he is free to dictate the price at which 
113 Ibid. 
114 See, e.g., Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954) . 
115 See, e.g., Parke, Davis & Co. v. G.EM., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 207 (D. Md. 1962) . 
116 Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 Yale L.J. 967 (1954) . 
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his product will be sold throughout the nation. Whether the effect of his 
ability to set a national price will lead to a level of prices that are substan­
tially in excess of prices competitively determined, no one really knows. 
Many economists guess that it would have that effect,117 but the evidence, 
other than theory, is rather wanting in respect either to their assertion or its 
denial.118 Also, by enabling the manufacturer to perform his price plan­
ning on a national scale, the act would sweep away whatever economic 
power was previously held by a localized group of retailers whose influ­
ence would then be matched against a national as opposed to a state­
wide trading policy. Finally, the form of the act itself may lead to grant­
ing so much additional power to manufacturers an!! making it so desirable 
to integrate vertically that a considerable amount of concentration may 
develop. Experience indicates that it is unlikely that concentration once 
developed can be effectively reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems reasonably probable that McGuire Act-sanctioned Fair 
Trade is an ailing concept. Of late, courts have bared their teeth at 
the concept and a bite at a time, as in Pennsylvania, or with a swift lunge 
at the jugular, have managed to end their state's experimentation with 
retail price maintenance. Failing in the states, the proponents now have 
a substantial representation for their viewpoint in Congress. The pro­
posed federal law, while in the main incorporating national Fair Trade 
provisions, introduces a small number of innovations some with even 
more controversial potential than existed under state Fair Trade. 
It is unquestionable that quality stabilization-Fair Trade-retail 
price maintenance, whatever it be called, deviates from the main stream 
of our statutorily announced economic policy. In a country that has long 
taught, as a matter of horn-book economics, that price and quality of 
goods are determined and controlled by competitive forces, the new sug­
gestion that price be controlled by trademark holders and quality pro­
tected by ample profit margins strikes a dissenting note. To be sure, 
state Fair Trade has never approached the predictions of economic doom 
117 See, e.g., statement of Stewart M. Lee, Chairman, Department of Economics and Busi­
ness Administration, Geneva College. Hearings on S.J. Res. 159, supra note 83, at 290-306 
(1962) . 
118 Dr. Lee, despite having more adequate statistical support than most of the other 
witnesses before the subcommittee, stated, "Let me be the first to admit that these ' figures 
are nothing but educated estimates . • . .  " Id. at 294. 
808 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 
that have been uttered of it. Moreover, it may well be that quality sta­
bilization, if passed, will fail because of some of the same vices which 
are rapidly carrying away its predecessor. However, it may also be 
that for better or for worse quality stabilization will achieve the result 
that has long been attempted of Fair Trade. 
